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Abstract: Cloud computing is a recently developed new technology for complex systems with massive-
scale services sharing among many users. One of the most important security objectives is to achieve
secure user authentication. If it is breached, confidentiality and integrity of the data may be compro-
mised. We propose an identity-based mutual authentication protocol, where identity verification is car-
ried out by multiple servers applying secret sharing technology on the cloud provider side. Robustness
and elasticity of the cloud are ensured by its hierarchical structure.
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Introduction
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and ser-
vices) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction. OpenStack is one of the most popular cloud computing software. OpenStack Identity ser-
vice supports multiple methods of authentication, including user name and password, LDAP, and exter-
nal authentication methods (i.e. Kerberos). There are fears about these systems due to their centralized
structure. Services storing password information for a large number of enterprises in a central database
are primary targets for hackers (e.g. Golden Ticket Attack [10,12], OneLogin attack). In the scientific
literature generally centralized, one-factor [8,9] or two-factor identity verification protocols [3,4] are
proposed. However, the concept of multiple-server model may enhance the security level. Brainard
et.al. suggested a two-server approach in [2], where two servers together decide on the correctness of
the password submitted for authentication. In [6], a multiple-server authentication protocol is designed,
where one-time passwords are shared among the cloud servers. Merkle tree or a hash tree [11] is applied
for verifying the correctness of the one-time password.
Boneh and Franklin [1] formalized the notion of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) using bilinear pair-
ings over elliptic curve groups. In IBE setting, the public key of a user can be any arbitrary string, typi-
cally the e-mail address. There is no need for Bob to go to the Certificate Authority to verify the public
key of Alice. This way an IBE can greatly simplify certificate management. The authors presented an
identity-based authentication for cloud computing in [7], based on the identity-based hierarchical model
for cloud computing. There are several servers participating in the identity verification process, for each
user authentication one encryption and one signature generation are needed.
We propose an identity-based mutual cloud authentication protocol, where user identity is verified
by multiple servers. A user authenticates himself by his password with a help of a smart card capable of
cryptographic calculations and storing values securely. For each authentication users should give their
passwords, hence end-to-end identity verification is achieved. Users decide about the number of servers
participate during authentication. The structure of the servers is hierarchical ensuring robustness and
elasticity for the cloud. Due to the bilinear property we accomplish the multiple server key exchange and
password registration with a single message transmission. In the authentication phase secret sharing is
applied, mutual authentication is achieved only by two modular exponentiations besides the fast hash
calculations and xor operations.
The proposed scheme
In this section, we describe our protocol. We differentiate two participants: Users (U ) ask for services
from the cloud service provider consisting of several cloud servers (Ci). A cloud server which is cho-
sen randomly proceeds the steps of the user authentication. The protocol is composed of two stages:
Registration and Authentication.
Registration
During registration a bilinear map, two hash functions and other system parameters are set. Secret keys
are also exchanged between each user and cloud server. We give the definition of the bilinear map.
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Definition 1 (Admissible bilinear map). Let G1 and G2 be two groups of order q for some large prime q. A
map ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 is an admissible bilinear map if satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear: We say that a map ê : G1×G1 → G2 is bilinear if ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and
all a, b ∈ Z.
2. Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in G1 × G1 to the identity in G2. Since G1, G2 are
groups of prime order, if P is a generator of G1, e(P, P ) is a generator of G2.
3. Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G1.
Hash functions H1 : {0; 1}∗ → G1, H : {0; 1}∗ → Z∗q and two random values z, γ ∈ Z∗q are also
chosen. In our identity-based setting let Q = γP denote the public and γ the secret key of the Private
Key Generator (PKG). For each Ci a (PKi = Yi = H1(IDi), SKi = γYi) keypair is generated, where the
secret key is generated by PKG and IDi is a publicly known identity information.
Between each U and Ci secret values Di are exchanged securely in a way that only a digitally signed
message is sent by U on a public channel. We assume the existence of a Bulletin Board (ββ) that is
publicly readable and can be written by PKG only. A public key exchange parameter xiP is stored for
eachCi on ββ. Cloud servers build a binary tree structure, secret key exchange parameter xi is generated
by the child elements, in case of leaf elements by the parent and the sister element. If a server breaks
down, it can be replaced, therefore scalability and robustness of the cloud is assured.
Figure 1: Registration phase
The calculations of the registration can be seen on Fig 1. Each user sends his password pw securely
to Croot. The message is signed by U with an identity-based signature. Croot broadcasts (m,Sign(m)),
eachCi calculatesDi = ê(xiYi, zsP ). On the other side U computes and stores ê(xiP, Yi)z , by calculating
the sth power Di is generated.
Authentication
In the authentication phase mutual authentication between the user and randomly chosen cloud servers
is processed. U chooses k servers (Ci1 , Ci2 , . . . , Cik ) randomly. Cloud servers Cij , where j = 1, . . . , k
verify the knowledge of the static password (pw) and the secret key (Dij ) exchanged during Registration.
A random value v is generated by a time-based pseudo random number generator. Cloud server
Cv performs the authentication. User U gives his password and his smart card computes H(Dwv ) =
H(ê(xvP, Yv)
zsw). U chooses a bitstring w randomly and generates bitstrings wi1 , wi2 ,. . . , wik such that
wi1 ⊕ wi2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wik = w, and each share is added to the hashed secret value exchanged during Regis-
tration. One can see that the random value w can be calculated on server side only if the cloud servers
know the secret values exchanged. Therefore by generating the valid value H(Dw
′
v )⊕w′ authentication
of cloud servers is completed.
Security analysis
Secure mutual authentication prevents adversaries to impersonate a legal user or a cloud server and
to achieve illegal access to user data. In this section we give an informal security analysis of the proposed
protocol. We consider vulnerability against the replay attack, impersonation attack, and different types
of off-line attacks (e.g. dictionary attack, rainbow table attack).
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Figure 2: Authentication phase
A replay attack is successful, if by re-transmitting a previously sent message an adversary is able to
authenticate himself. Since during authentication each message depends on a randomly generated w,
therefore message freshness is achieved providing resistance against replay attack.
In order to impersonate a legal participant secret valuesDi are necessary. ValuesDi can be calculated
only if both the password and secretly stored z, or both the cloud secret key and secret value xi are
known. Secret value xi is not known by PKG, hence even PKG cannot carry out an impersonation
attack. During authentication only the randomized hash values of Di are sent. Due to the randomness
and preimage, collision resistant hash functions no impersonation attack can be performed.
Most of the password-based authentication protocols use verification tables that are vulnerable against
off-line attacks. A typical countermeasure is the use of salts. In our system the secret, random value z
protects against week passwords.
Since the smart card does not store the password, the user always needs to give the password during
the authentication phase, end-to-end identity verification is ensured.
Conclusion
We have designed an authentication protocol for the cloud environment which applies secret sharing
and identity-based key exchange. Our system is robust against server breakdown and applies multiple-
server identity verification. It is important to note that during the authentication phase we use k+3 hash
calculations, 3k xor operations and two modular exponentiations, hence we have achieved an efficient
scheme.
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